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MANN-HANDLING HISTORY:
GEORGE WASHINGTON, GNADENHUTTEN AND GENOCIDE
Abstract
A series of recent uncritical accounts
have branded General George Wash-
ington as directly responsible for the
Gnadenhutten Massacre (Mann 1997,
2000, 2001, 2005). A review of the litera-
ture corrects this and other Nativistic
revisionist errors of fact.
Introduction
The Gnadenutten Massacre of March
8,1782, in which, as the memorial shaft at
Gnadenhutten states, 90 Christian
Indians "triumphed in death," remains the
single most horrific incident of the Ohio
Valley border wars. Although the details
of the appalling affair have been well
known, so far as possible, for many
years, thanks to the work of early histo-
rians such as Heckewelder, Draper, But-
terfield, and more recently Paul A.
Wallace and Earl Olmstead, it is impos-
sible to disagree with Butterfield's com-
ment that "No one of the prominent
events occurring in the West during the
Revolution has been written about with
so much ignorance of the facts as
Williamson's expedition to the Tus-
carawas ... Nearly all published accounts
from Doddridge to Roosevelt contain
many errors. Among the Moravian
writers, there is nothing lacking in col-
oring or in misstatements; and, with
some of them, there is downright falsifi-
cation" (Butterfield 1890: 163-164). On
the other hand, the American participants
in the event remained so close-mouthed
in after years that there is no completely
trustworthy account of the events on their
side either. In regard to Dr. Barbara A.
Mann's work, it can only be said that this
regrettable tradition continues.
Archaeological confirmation of the
event, were any needed, occurred with
excavation of portions of the site in 1973
by the late Jan Whitman and George
Reymond (Crouch 1973: 4). But historical
accuracy is more elusive, and it is espe-
cially disturbing to see a contemporary
Indian activist twist and select facts for
what seem to be political and psycholog-
ical motives. Fortunately, the scholarship
of Mann, a lecturer in English literature at
the University of Toledo, is susceptible to
testing by reviewing the extensive docu-
mentary record, so that her more egre-
gious factual errors can be easily
identified. While her reliance on Native
American oral history cannot be tested as
directly, it proves to be equally suspect if
not more so.
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Her Story
According to Mann (2000: 46), "in early
April, 1782 [actually, early March, 1782],"
General Washington, "Ieaming that 106
starving women, children, and old folks
- all but sixteen of them Delaware -
Mahican neutrals - had gone back to
[the Moravian settlements along the Tus-
carawas) to recover their food, authorized
a raid out of Fort Pitt by Colonel David
Williamson of the Pennsylvania Regi-
ment." Again, "Washington okayed a
foray out of Fort Pitt by the Pennsylvania
Regiment under Colonel David
Williamson to intercept them [Delaware
returning to the Tuscarawas region to
retrieve their harvests)" (Mann 2001: 158).
Yet again, "The Goschochking genocide
was the attempt by the Revolutionary
Army out of Fort Pitt to 'wipe out' the
Lenape and Mahican of Ohio, the better
to serve the fine farm hands [sic) of the
Muskingum Valley for European settle-
ment after the Revolution." Following the
Gnadenhutten massacre, according to
Mann, Williamson and his men "Gleefully
hauled their ill-gotten booty - the stolen
harvest, plus the people's clothes, scalps,
animals, and farm implements - to Pitts-
burgh, where they sold it for personal
profit," killing an additional 30 Delaware
Indians along the way. This Mann-han-
dling of history is repeated in more detail
in her most recent effusion, along with
very biased accounts of the Sullivan and
Brodhead expeditions into New York and
the earlier destruction of the Coshocton
settlement by Brodhead, as well as
George Rogers Clark's expedition to Vin-
cennes and various forays into Ohio
(Mann 2005).
Her Method
Checking Mann's sources for her
remarkable assertions about Washington,
beginning with her own self-citation, which
she artfully describes as "a smoother sec-
ondary account," we find that her original
opinion was simply that "General Wash-
ington certainly knew of, and most likely
authorized, the action" [italics added). In
fact, compelling and readily available evi-
dence ignored or misrepresented by Mann
documents that Washington neither knew
of nor authorized the Gnadenhuften action.
Further, the local militia led by Col. David
Williamson was not "Revolutionary Army"
but local Pennsylvania militia raised not at
Fort Pitt but mustered at Mingo Bottom,
seventy-five miles below presentday Pitts-
burgh (Olmstead 1991: 55). General Irvine,
who took command of Fort Pitt in
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November, 1781, was summoned to
Philadelphia by General Washington and
was absent Fort Pitt from January 16th
through March 25th, 1782, leaving it in
charge of Col. John Gibson. In an April
12th letter to his wife, Irvine describes the
Gnadenhutten Massacre, of which he first
heard on his return to Fort Pitt on March
25th, as follows: "Things were in a strange
state when I arrived [back at Fort Pitt). A
number of the country people [italics
added) had just returned from the Mora-
vian towns, about one hundred miles dis-
tant, where, it is said, they did not spare
either age or sex." In short, the Williamson
Expedition was not ordered by General
Washington, General Irvine, or Colonel
John Gibson, did not proceed from Fort
Pitt, and was not the work of the Revolu-
tionary Army.
The only source for Mann's claim that
George Washington ordered the
Williamson Expedition is her convoluted
misreading of his March 8th,1782, letter
to Irvine, written, as she is aware, at
Philadelphia on the very day of the
Gnadenhutten atrocity, while Irvine was at
his home in Carlisle, Pennsylvania (But-
terfield 1882: 94-96). Touted as Wash-
ington's "Order" for the raid, it is no such
thing. In this letter Washington instructed
Irvine to proceed to Fort Pitt with all con-
venient dispatch and "take such meas-
ures for the security of that post and for
the defense of the western frontier, as
your continental force, combined with the
militia of the neighboring country, will
admit." Washington could promise no
additional regular forces, so that offensive
operations, except upon a small scale,
were out of the question; but Irvine
should keep himself informed of the situ-
ation at Detroit and the strength of the
enemy there. As for reports from Colonel
Gibson that the regulars at Fort Pitt were
on the verge of revolt due to lack of pro-
visions, clothing, and back pay, arrange-
ments initiated while Irvine was at
Philadelphia would relieve the grounds
for complaint. There is clear evidence in
this letter and elsewhere that the meas-
ures [being) taken referred to providing
payment for the soldiers at Fort Pitt, yet
somehow Mann (1997: 166) is able to
transmogrify these straight-forward
instructions into a coded message that
these "measures" were "the genocide of
the Delaware-Mahicans and the robbery
of their harvest, horses and furs by an
army detachment dispatched out of Fort
Pitt." According to her scenario, "back
pay and provisions formed the motive
and the promise." She then cites histo-
rian C. W. Butterfield as supporting her
contention that the Williamson Expedition
was "an army detachment dispatched
out of Ft. Pitt." But Butterfield does no
such thing, stating that "James Marshel,
lieutenant of Washington county, Penn-
sylvania, ordered out, according to law,
some of the militia to march across the
Ohio and attack them ["British Indians" at
the recently deserted Moravian towns on
the Tuscarawas]." Perhaps most egre-
gious is Mann's assertion that Wash-
ington in this letter "personally assigned"
"the Virginia and Pennsylvania militias" to
Fort Pitt, when he did not. What the letter
plainly states is that Washington could
not promise more than a portion of the
"Virginia and Pensilvania Regiments
which are already on the Western Sta-
tion" [italics added]; that is, Revolutionary
soldiers and not the local militia, which he
did not command and in fact did not
have the authority to "assign."
As for provisions, Irvine's correspon-
dence indicates no reliance upon the
Moravian Delaware (although they had
provided some provisions to his prede-
cessor, Colonel Brodhead), casual refer-
ences occurring in initial letters back to
his wife in Carlisle, Pennsylvania:
"Colonel Gibson talks of sending an Ohio
pike ... I would send some venison but
fear it would not keep - of which and
wild turkey, we have great plenty." Again,
December 2, 1781: "I hope the pike got
safe [to Carlisle]. We have great plenty of
them - venison and turkey and other
pretty good living. We even have a pack
of hounds and go frequently a hunting."
(Butterfield 1882: 340-341). There is no
denying that Fort Pitt was often short of
provisions, but the Continental soldiers'
chief complaint was not receiving their
pay for months on end, and it is to this
that Washington clearly refers in his letter
of March 8, not to some arcane plan to
recompense the local militia with plunder
from the Indian village. An attempt to
obtain payment for his troops was actu-
ally one of the chief reasons for Irvine's
return to Philadelphia. But the county
militia were not paid by the federal gov-
ernment, and while Williamson's men
found and took a great deal of plunder in
the form of furs and horses at Gnaden-
hutten, they could hardly consider such
booty as Washington's or Irvine's pay-
ment for their military service, since they
did not expect pay from the Revolu-
tionary government.
Mann copies the tone and method of
her mentor, Ward Churchill, who swiftly if
not deftly dismisses theories not to his
liking as 'patently idiotic speculations,'
'absurd contentions,' 'ridiculous,' 'non-
sensical,' and 'astonishing,' all in a single
sentence [Churchill 1997:135]. Mann's
work for the most part is more vendetta
than history, further tarnished by sloppy
scholarship. So uneven, ambiguous, and
contradictory is the existing historical evi-
dence that one can easily become
bogged down in relatively minor discrep-
ancies that at this late date are not easily
reconciled or resolved, and it is almost
impossible for anyone with a vested
interest to refrain from selecting the evi-
dence most favorable to their interpreta-
tion. Mann, however, not only picks and
chooses but distorts and misrepresents,
straying even further from the truth by
denying or ignoring facts that appear
incontestable.
Another typical example of such distor-
tion and inaccurate scholarship is Mann's
assessment of contemporary newspaper
coverage of the massacre. She asserts
(1997:168-169) that "Like most instances
of military mass murder committed
against Native Americans, the deed was
presented in the eastern gazettes as a
glorious American victory in a pitched
battle with blood-thirsty warriors." This is
not at all the case. Initial newspaper
accounts were inaccurate in many
details, often stating, for example, that
the Indians were massacred while asleep
in bed but hardly painting them as
"blood-thirsty warriors." Mann similarly
misrepresents the earliest newspaper
account as "a glowing notice" posted by
Williamson "crowing over his great victory
against the 'Mingos.'" (Mann 2000:47).
There is not a shred of evidence to sug-
gest that the Pennsylvania Gazette [not
the "Philadelphia Gazette] account (pub-
lished the previous day in the Pennsyl-
vania Packet, April 16, 1782) was written
by Williamson and in fact it is very
unlikely. Nor does it describe a great vic-
tory against the "Mingos" (who are
nowhere mentioned in the article except
for a reference to the mustering of the
militia at Mingo Bottom).
Similarly, Mann anachronistically and
inaccurately describes New York cov-
erage as "cheerleading over the event,"
and cites Loskiel as authority for the
newspapers having found it "lamentable
that the militia had been prevented from
continuing on to Upper Sandusky, to kill
the rest of the Moravian converts" (Mann
2005:167). This is a gross distortion of
what Loskiel actually wrote: "the mur-
derers had been prevented, for the
present, from proceeding to Sandusky"
- no suggestion of any lamentation on
the part of any newspapers. Mann either
did not bother to examine any primary
sources or deliberately distorts them. Of
the two contemporary New York news-
paper accounts available, that in the New
York Gazette and Weekly Mercury (April
20, 1782, No. 159) reports the Moravian
Indians as "murdered in a most inhuman
Manner," also calling the murders "exe-
crable." The New York Royal Gazette of
April 24 (no. 581) simply extracts a letter
from Pittsburgh that relates that the
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Christian Indians were "butchered." Nei-
ther account can be represented as
"cheerleading," but Dr. Mann's definitions
are often highly idiosyncratic, and she
routinely defines words as well as events
to suit herself.
For example, accounts of Col.
Bowman's 1779 attack on Little Chilli-
cothe note that at one point in the retreat,
some of Bowman's men protected them-
selves by wearing solid planks on their
backs, puncheons torn from an Indian
hut, and as the men reached safety,
these puncheons were thrown away
(Draper Manuscripts 50 27: 1-20). As
Mann has it, these were the men's knap-
sacks which they discarded. In the next
sentence, paraphrasing Henry Hall's
account of the plunder, Mann converts a
shirt with [silver] broaches into a shirt with
stitches. Such relatively minor linguistic
gaucheries might be discounted but there
are more significant errors as well. In two
consecutive sentences ["...John Bowman,
an insignificant lieutenant of Kentucky in
search of easy fame and booty, having
tired of serving in Clark's shadow, rein-
vented himself as a militia colonel. Side-
tracking 296 reinforcements intended for
Clark to deploy at Vincennes, Bowman
led them onto Shawnee land."] Mann
makes a record number of errors of fact
or interpretation. Bowman was appointed
the Colonel of the militia of Kentucky Co.,
Virginia, by Governor Patrick Henry in
1776; he assumed these not insignificant
duties the following summer when he
arrived at Harrodsburgh. Subsequently, in
1778, Governor Thomas Jefferson com-
missioned him Lieutenant of Kentucky
Co. and he became responsible for the
general direction of military affairs in that
region. No "re-invention" and no indica-
tion that he felt he was serving "in the
shadow" of George Rogers Clark. In the
face of Indian depredations, as early as
1778 Bowman, while under siege at
Boonesborough, contemplated an expe-
dition against the Shawnee, but the effort
did not get under way until the following
year. Bowman's men were recruited
specifically for this foray and had in no
sense been intended to join Clark at Vin-
cennes. In fact, some of the men joining
Bowman were returning up the Ohio
River with mastodon bones from Big
Bone Lick and had nothing whatever to
do with Clark's expedition. Further, these
local militia, throughout the history of the
Revolution, were very difficult to control,
a large part of the reason for the compar-
ative failure of Bowman's expedition, and
dispersed back to their homes well
before Bowman eventually received a
request from Clark to join him in Illinois.
Loskiel's (3, 183) claim that Indian
scalps were "exposed to view' at the
auction purportedly held at Pittsburgh
becomes Mann's assertion that they were
"waved about." Heckewelder's vague ref-
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erence to human razor-straps being
hawked "at or near Pittsburgh sometime
during the Revolutionary War," part of his
lengthy, disingenuous, and unnecessary
attempt to demonstrate that the Euro-
peans were even more cruel than the
Indians, Mann attributes specifically to
the Gnadenhutten incident, with a care-
less, undocumented flair worthy of nov-
elist Allen Eckert, shifting such factoids
around to suit her purpose.
Although her work is larded with foot-
notes, these vie with her text in terms of
inaccuracy and fail to mask her unfamil-
iarity with the material. For example,
archaeologist and historian Charles Whit-
tlesey, who wrote a brief article on the
Gnadenhutten massacre, is repeatedly
called Charles Mutterly. Reverend
Nathaniel Seiler, a Moravian Bishop, is
cited as the Reverend Nathaniel Bishop.
Historical accuracy aside, Mann's grasp
of the use of metaphor is certainly not what
it should be for a university Instructor in
English. Despite her adamant belief that
Eurocentric concepts should not be
applied to interpretation of Native Amer-
ican history and life (Mann 2003: 169-170)
she follows the lead of "scholaractivist"
Ward Churchill and mantra-like repeatedly
uses the terms "genocide" and holocaust
interchangeably to describe the Gnaden-
hutten Massacre and similar atrocities,
even going so far as to claim that the term
"holocaust" is of Iroquoian derivation! It is
correct that Parker (1926: 126-128) headed
his brief description of Sullivan's "punitive
expedition' [also Parker's words] as "The
Holocaust," but this is clearly a metaphor-
ical use of the term used to emphasize the
"scorched earth" nature of Sullivan's expe-
dition. (Parker also accurately described it
as "a decisive campaign" and "an out-
standing achievement of the Revolutionary
War.") The use and meaning of words
gradually change, and there has been a
great deal of "inflationary usage" of the
term "holocaust" in recent years (Rosen-
baum 2001). Mann is not the first to apply
it to the history of the American Indian, but
her argument might be better served by
accepting the rather obvious fact that for
most reasonable people the term Holo-
caust has come to represent that perpe-
trated by the German Reich, and simply
concentrate on the genocidal aspects of
American Indian history.
Similar to her problem with metaphor,
Mann exhibits an inability to recognize the
use of rhetorical irony when she lashes out
at the epitaph found on the Gnadenhutten
monument, asserting that the deaths of the
Christian Indians was no triumph for them
but only for "Williamson and crew." On the
other hand she seems no less indignant at
Moravian historian Loskiel's observation of
the unarguable fact that the Indians do not
technically qualify as Christian martyrs
since they were not murdered because of
their religion but because they were
Indians. Loskiel's remark, incidentally, is
tacit recognition of the genocidal nature of
the Gnadenhutten incident some 150 years
before the term "genocide" was coined.
In regard to the Gnadenhutten monu-
ment and cemetery, Mann's nativistic
agenda is highlighted by the sly claim
that the remains of the martyrs were
buried "in a very traditional burial
mound" by Delaware Indians who
returned after the massacre (Mann 2005:
166). This is a complete fabrication and
an outrageous rewriting of documented
history. The remains were still lying on the
ground as late as 1797, when Heck-
ewelder and others revisited Gnaden-
hutten on a surveying trip. "Everywhere
bones could be seen, & in the cellars of
the houses, where some of the Brethren
had been massacred & burnt, they were
also to be found" (Jordan 1886: 141).
According to De Schweinitz (1870; 647n1),
in October 1799 the bones of the murdered
Indians were reinterred in one of the cellars
of the old town by John Heckewelder and
David Peter.
History
A large part of Mann's confusion about
the causes of the Gnadenhutten Massacre
can be assigned to her persistent refusal to
distinguish between the Revolutionary or
colonial forces stationed at Fort Pitt and
the local county militias of the back
country. Although she frequently cites the
work of "triumphalist historian" Consul W.
Butterfield, it would have been well to
ponder one of the footnotes in Butterfield's
Washington-Irvine Correspondence, in
which he makes clear that one reason for
the failure of an earlier expedition against
the Wyandots and Mingoes at Pluggy's
Town (now Delaware, Ohio) was "a want of
concert" between the commander at Fort
Pitt, [then] General Edward Hand, and the
lieutenants and militia officers of the border
counties of Virginia and Pennsylvania. As
Butterfield observes, a very real distinction
existed between the lieutenants of the var-
ious counties of these two states and the
officers of the [Revolutionary or continental]
militia who happened to be stationed
therein. The former were appointed by the
respective commonwealths and had con-
trol of and general supervision over military
affairs of the county, receiving the title of
Colonel, and such was Colonel David
Williams. Under their orders were the offi-
cers of the various battalions of militia in
the different counties (Butterfield 1882:
12n). This distinction between continentals
and count[r]y militia is carefully delineated
throughout contemporary documents of
the period and is a commonplace among
historians. This important distinction has
been most cogently explored by Sadosky
(2001), who thoroughly defines and
explores the distinct differences in social
class and ideology between the two
groups, though the distinction was implicit
in accounts as long ago as Doddridge
(1824), a distinction completely lost on
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Mann. Only on April 5, 1782, a month after
the Gnadenhutten Massacre was General
Irvine able to meet with the county lieu-
tenants and get them to promise to exert
themselves in drawing out the militia on his
requisitions (Butterfield 1882: 104-105). In
sum, neither Washington nor Irvine actually
had the authority to command the local
volunteer militia.
Mann's assertion that the motive for the
Gnadenhutten massacre was the militia's
desire for provisions and booty to compen-
sate them for lack of provisions at Fort Pitt
and that the militia were formally "ordered
forth" on this mission from Fort Pitt [the
implication being that they were so ordered
by General Irvine or Washington] cites But-
terfield's account in his "History of the
Girtys" (Butterfield 1890: 155, 239, 240).
But if we actually check Butterfield, we find
that (p.155) it was in response to the Wal-
lace abductions, the capture of John Car-
penter, and several other incidents, that
James Marshel, lieutenant of Washington
County, Pennsylvania, ordered some of the
local militia to march across the Ohio and
attack the Indians. Butterfield therein cites
pages 239-240 of an entirely different work
(contra Mann), the Washington-Irvine Cor-
respondence, which documents that it was
Marshel, "the highest military authority of
Washington county," who ordered the
expedition. The documentation occurs in a
series of subsequent letters between Gen-
eral Irvine, who was asked by the Pennsyl-
vania Council to investigate the matter.
The immediate cause of the Williamson
expedition was the kidnapping of Mrs.
Robert Wallace and her children, not a
desire to steal Indian provisions. Numerous
historic sources document the fate of this
pioneer mother and her children. On Feb-
ruary 10, 1782, Mrs. Wallace and her three
children were taken captive at their cabin
on Raccoon Creek, by a band of 40
Indians, including 30 Delaware and ten
others believed to be Wyandots (Butterfield
1890:154). Two days earlier, Indians had
killed John Fink near Buchanan Fort
(Withers: 232-233), and soon after John
Carpenter was captured on Buffalo Creek
(Butterfield 1890: 155). Carpenter later
escaped, but the Wallaces were not so for-
tunate. Before reaching the Ohio River, by
some accounts, the Indians tomahawked
Mrs. Wallace and her infant daughter.
According to Heckewelder, however, the
murders occurred after crossing the Ohio
(Wallace 1958:190) The Wallace sons,
aged ten and two and a half years were
taken to Sandusky, where the elder died;
the younger was eventually rescued. Wher-
ever the Wallace murders occurred, even
Heckewelder preserves the atrocious detail
that the Wallace baby's body was spitted
from "from between the Leggs until the
Neck, with its belly to the Indian Country &
its Face towards the Settlement over the
River" (Wallace 1958: 190).
Mann's take on the Wallace murders is a
remarkable example both of sangfroid and
of the blase distortion of historical fact.
Concerned by the possibility that "the
metaphor in this bit of [Iroquois] League
signage is still apt to fly by modem readers
overwhelmed by its 'savagery'," she
explains at length that the opposite direc-
tions of face and belly symbolized the dis-
honesty of the European invaders, the face
left pointing South, to where the child really
belonged, while the belly facing Ohio was
"a condemnation of greedy Europeans
who starved League children literally to
death, needlessly taking food out of their
mouths to fill the bellies of illegal aliens!
(Mann 1997: 165). According to her, these
"League troops" were merely intent on
enforcing the 1775 Treaty of Pittsburgh and
the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, both pro-
hibiting homesteading north of the Ohio
River: "Finding illegal settlers in Ohio, the
League had executed the trespassing
family," and she dismissed the Wallace
murders as "a bad public relations move."
The problem with this mind-boggling argu-
ment is that these Indian depredations
were visited on settlers living east of the
Ohio River - the Wallace cabin was along
Raccoon Creek in present-day Washington
County, Pennsylvania, John Fink was killed
on the Monongahela River, and John Car-
penter was captured on Buffalo Creek,
near present-day Wellsburg, West Virginia
[although he was guilty of trespassing west
of the Ohio], so that in these instances it
was the Indians who were violating the Fort
Stanwix and Pittsburgh treaties!
Genocide
Genocide can most generically be
defined as the systematic killing of
people because of their race or ethnicity.
Most authorities would infer that "sys-
tematic" implies state-sanction and thor-
oughness [i.e., "finality" in the sense of
not sparing women and children]. The
fact that the Euro-American onslaught on
Native Americans was gradual, con-
ducted over a period of centuries, and
generally much less "systematic" than
the Jewish Shoah or Holocaust does little
to disqualify it as genocidal, although
Katz (2001) succinctly and successfully
makes the case that the Holocaust "is
phenomenologically unique by virtue of
the fact that never before has a state set
out, as a matter of intentional principle
and actualized policy, to annihilate physi-
cally every man, woman and child
belonging to a specific people."
The fact that comparable atrocities
were committed on both sides does not
excuse the massacre of innocent
Delaware Indians at Gnadenhutten along
with guilty Wyandot warriors and possibly
some not-so-innocent Delawares. All
were killed merely because they were
Indian and in the wrong place at the
wrong time. But the race hatred charac-
teristic of the American frontier was not
necessarily national policy at this point,
though arguably it may have been at
other times in the nation's history.
The narrower question of whether
George Washington deliberately author-
ized and promulgated the systematic
murder of all Indians can be answered
only in the negative. One must also be
mindful that from the American point of
view, the nation was at war with the
British and, after four of the Iroquois
nations ended their neutrality in 1777,
with the British Indian allies until Sep-
tember 3, 1783. Thus, while the Sullivan
campaign was undoubtedly brutal, much
of Mann's criticism of the "scorched
earth" policy ordered by Washington is
irrelevant in this context. While Sullivan's
men destroyed housing and provender,
their actions were no different than that of
Indians in their forays upon the American
settlements. Further, it is well docu-
mented that Sullivan did not kill women
and children.
Conclusion: The Wolves of the Forest
Mann is not the first to label Washington
racist on the basis of flimsy evidence, mis-
interpreted or misrepresented facts, and
statements taken out of context. According
to revisionist historian Jennings (1988: 62-
63), Washington would denounce Indians
as "having nothing human except the
shape," a quotation that, unfortunately, is
not at all accurate. "What compunction,"
Jennings asks, "could a man with such
attitudes have about the rights of Indian
tribes or the welfare of Indian persons?"
Perhaps a rhetorical question, it certainly
goes unanswered by Jennings, who was
intent on documenting the fact that Wash-
ington, "by personality or purpose," seems
to have stirred instant dislike among the
Mingos accompanying him on his journey
to Fort LeBoeuf in 1753. Interestingly,
when Jennings retold the story of Wash-
ington's expedition to Fort LeBoeuf, (Jen-
nings 1993: 290-291), the inaccurate
quotation was omitted, as well it should,
having been made years after the event at
hand. Further, as Christopher Gist's journal
makes clear, on their return trip, when
Washington was nearly killed by an Indian,
he prevented Gist from firing back, a telling
incident omitted by the historian (Dar-
lington 1893: 85).
What Washington actually wrote in his
1783 letter to James Duane, head of the
Congressional committee on Indian affairs,
was that "policy and economy point very
strongly to the expediency of being upon
good terms with the Indians, and the pro-
priety of purchasing their lands in prefer-
ence to attempting to drive them by force
of arms out of their country; which, as we
have already experienced, is like driving
the wild beasts of the forest, which will
return as soon as the pursuit is at an end,
and fall perhaps upon those that are left
there; when the gradual extension of our
settlements will as certainly cause the
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savage, as the wolf, to retire; both being
animals of prey, though they differ in
shape." This is no more racist than a
descriptive remark he made to Governor
Dinwiddie in 1756: "They prowl about like
wolves, and, like them, do their mischief by
stealth." Taken in context, Washington's
proposal to Duane is actually more
humane than the Congress' ultimate plan,
which largely ignored his recommendation
that the Indians should be compensated
for their lands.
Washington's "wolf" metaphor is no
more racist that Joseph Brant's less well
known remark explaining why he was
unable to take more frontier women and
children in the Minisink raid: " ... the many
Forts about the Place, into which they
were always ready to run like ground
Hogs." [letter to Col. Butler, July 29th
1779, Canada Archives, Haldimand Col-
lection, B 100:210; reprinted in The Sul-
livan-Clinton Campaign in 1779]. Colonel
Broadhead, in congratulating General
Sullivan on the success of his New York
campaign "against the Indians and the
more savage tories," remarked that
"Something still remains to be done to
the westward, which I expect leave to
execute, & then I conceive the wolves of
the forest will have sufficient cause to
howl. .." (Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser.,
12: 165). Such metaphors, taken in the
context of their times, are no more racist
and no less metaphorical than the simile
in Byron's famous poem "The Destruction
of Sennacherib": "The Assyrian came
down like the wolf on the fold, and his
cohorts were gleaming in purple and
gold." And what of John Heckewelder
himself, who, suffering at the hands of
notorious frontier renegade Simon Girty,
described Girty as "this white beast in
human form"? (Heckewelder 1820: 333).
For once, Congress had it right when it
thanked Washington and General Sullivan
"for effectually executing an important
expedition against such of the Indian
nations as, encouraged by the councils
and conducted by the officers of his Brit-
tanic majesty, had perfidiously waged an
unprovoked and cruel war against the
United States, laid waste many of their
defenceless towns, and with savage bar-
barity slaughtered the inhabitants
thereof." (Journal of the Continental Con-
gress 15: 1169; italics added). Wash-
ington, perhaps with an eye on history, in
a telling statement ignored by Mann and
other Nativist activists, told Congress
(April 4, 1783):
"I have only to observe that the late
acts of cruelty mentioned in the speech
have not been committed under my
direction or by any party of Continental
troops nor have they been sanctioned by
orders from me. I rather think they have
been conducted with the approbation at
least, if not by the authority of individual
states. How far this practice is consistent
with the rules of propriety or principles of
policy, Congress must be the judge. For
myself, I must confess my mind revolts at
the idea of those wanton barbarities of
which both sides have in too many
instances been the unhappy witnesses."
Time and again it can be shown that
Washington did not wage war against all
Indians and often went out of his way to
aid those who were not enemies of his
country. As Wallace (1958: 170) wisely
notes, "... there was a magnanimity exhib-
ited towards their enemies by the principal
participants in the Revolution." This cer-
tainly was true of Washington: his mind
and his conscience were clear and he
would have nothing but contempt for those
who today twist facts in pursuit of their
own political ends. Racism can take many
forms, at its most overt ranging from the
hate crime to genocide but it also can
express itself more obliquely and more
insidiously, even in such academic sub-
jects as history, literature and literary criti-
cism, as evidenced by Mann's unjustified
diatribe against George Washington.
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THANKS TO GARY KAPUSTA
It is with great regret that with this
issue Gary Kapusta is stepping down as
ASO Treasurer. Because of not only per-
sonal health difficulties, but the loss of his
mother and other family considerations,
Gary Kapusta has reluctantly decided
that he could no longer conduct his
duties of Treasurer in accordance with the
high standards he had set for himself. He
has for ten years performed his office
with professionalism and an efficiency
seldom seen in a job that receives only
thanks for payment. We will miss his
advice and knowledge at our Board
meetings.
Few of our members will ever know the
important and crucial part Gary played in
holding our Society together in the crisis
of just a few years ago. Our Board of
Directors was split eight to seven and
came within a whisker of falling apart. At
stake was whether the Board of Directors
or the President controlled the Society.
Fortunately, because of the efforts of
Gary and other officers - we called our-
selves the Concerned Eight - our
Society survived and is today stronger
than ever. Over those two or three years
of crisis, the dedication and belief in our
Society by Gary was the glue that held us
together. He became, and still is, one of
my best friends.
No single person did as much as Gary
Kapusta in keeping our Society what it was
intended to be - an association of people
- amateurs, professionals and collectors
- all having the common goal of learning
about and making the world aware of Ohio
archaeology. I can honestly say that
without Gary Kapusta there might not
today be an Archaeological Society of
Ohio. Our Society will never again have a
more dedicated, honest and sincere officer
- we could all emulate him.
But we don't want this to sound like a
goodbye at all. We hope that Gary's
health will improve and that he will in the
future be able to again serve our Society
as a Trustee or in some other capacity.
But in the meantime, Gary, don't forget
us. It would be a happy day for everyone
to see you again at one of our Board
meetings. We owe you a debt of gratitude
which can never be repaid.
The plaque shown here is in appreciation
for Gary's untiring work for our Society.
Bob Converse
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